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Tibet and China’s ‘National Minority’ Policies 
 
by Michael C. Davis  
 
Michael C. Davis is a Professor in the University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law. This 
article is a revised version of a paper he delivered at a conference on “Contested 
Terrain: China’s Periphery and International Relations in Asia. The event was sponsored 
by the Foreign Policy Research Institute and the Reserve Officers Association in 
Washington, D.C. on November 4, 2011.  
 
Abstract: China’s hardline and repressive policies have often stood in the way of its 
acceptance on the international stage. This legacy has nowhere been more evident than with 
respect to its national minority policies applied in Tibet. While China long ago in the 1951 
17-point Agreement agreed to provide autonomy to Tibetans it has never delivered on this 
promise, offering repression and assimilation instead. In nearly every diplomatic outing, as was 
especially evident in the lead up to the 2008 Beijing Olympics, China’s Tibet policies have 
been an issue. With the 2007 UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples and the 
2008 Tibetan Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People China surely has 
excellent guidance for a more humane policy to meet Tibetan concerns. With reference to its 
historical legacy and international standards, this paper encourages China to embrace such 
policy reform.  
 
 
hina has recently taken to labeling claims to peripheral territory as “core 
interest,” as if such labeling might eliminate any competing claims While 
the past year has most notably seen the extension of such designation to 
regions beyond China’s current control in the East and South China seas, 
Beijing has long taken such aggressive posture regarding occupied areas along its 
Western borders—especially in Tibet and the Uyghur areas of present-day 
Xinjiang. Each of these areas shares the status of being the homeland of a 
distinctive nationality with a separate language, culture and history. Both were 
occupied by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) soon after its founding. 
While the Tibetan and Uyghur areas share in common aggressive and dismissive 
C 
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Chinese national minority policies and laws, their distinctive history and 
analytical posture make the coverage of one case, Tibet, a fruitful vehicle for 
exploring the implications of such nationality policies in the border regions 
more generally. After decades of Chinese posturing over foreign criticism and 
discussions with the exiled Tibetan leader, the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan case 
offers a telling example with  
 
deep implications for Chinese foreign policy and assessing China’s rise. The 
Tibet issue has been most directly of concern to China’s immediate neighbor, 
India, but has also been a long-standing foreign policy concern in both the 
United States and Europe. 
Superficially, the positions publicly taken by the Tibetan leadership in 
exile and the Chinese government appear to overlap considerably. 1  The 
Dharamsala-based Government-in-Exile, under the Dalai Lama and its newly 
elected Kalon Tripa or Prime Minister, has long sought a renewed agreement 
granting Tibet genuine autonomy under the Chinese constitution. Proposals in 
this regard were formally submitted to the Chinese Government in the 2008 
Tibetan Memorandum of Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People. 2  As 
discussed below, the Chinese Government has likewise claimed to offer 
autonomy under its national minority laws. Such autonomy was first promised 
in respect to Tibet under a Seventeen-point Agreement reached between the 
PRC and the Dalai Lama in 1951.3  
While China has since extended this autonomy promise in much more 
limited form to fifty-five designated national minorities, the Tibetan case of an 
historic nation on China’s border has remained distinctive, as the only “national 
minority” with which the PRC has entered a bilateral agreement, promising a 
high degree of autonomy under an indigenous form of self-rule. The Tibet case 
shares only with the Uyghur case the status of a border nationality with 
historically distinct identity occupying a substantial portion of the territory 
currently ruled by the PRC. 4  However, even the Uyghur do not possess a 
comparable agreement with the PRC government. The Seventeen-Point 
Agreement is widely believed to be the precursor to the “one country, two 
systems” model, with its “high degree of autonomy” now applied in Hong 
Kong and Macau, though the PRC government refuses to apply such Hong 
Kong model in Tibet. China’s designation of fifty-five national minorities may 
aim at watering down the distinctive status and consequent obligations to the 
Tibetan people. Except for the Tibetans, Uyghur and Mongols, most minority 
                                                          
1 Warren W. Smith, Jr. sees the two sides position as irreconcilable, as the central issue for 
Tibetans is the maintenance of Tibetan national identity and for the Chinese is to extinguish it. 
Warren W. Smith,  Jr. China's Tibet: Autonomy or Assimilation (Boulder: Rowman and Littlefield, 
2008) p. 279. 
2 “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Issued During the Eighth Sino-
Tibetan Meeting, Nov. 4, 2008 (hereinafter “Tibetan Memorandum”). See also “Summary of the 
Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People,” Dharamsala, India, Nov. 16, 2008. 
3  Agreement of the Central People’s Government and the Local Government of Tibet on 
Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet, May 23, 1951 (hereinafter “Seventeen-point 
Agreement”). 
4 Tibetan areas currently occupied by the PRC make up roughly one-quarter of the present PRC. 
The other border nationality with substantial historical territory are the Mongols, though they 
have been reduced to a small minority in their region. 
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nationalities are well within historically occupied Chinese territory and do not 
contest Chinese sovereignty.  
Assessing Chinese public pronouncements and policies in light of 
international practices and standards may shed light on the current impasse and 
suggest possible alternatives going forward. This article addresses these Chinese 
policies and pronouncements in four parts: first, to set the tone, the stridency of 
China’s recent public statements in the shadow of the 2008 Tibetan uprising and 
the Beijing Olympics; second, historical policies and current practice regarding 
the claimed provision of autonomy in Tibet; third, international standards 
regarding similarly situated indigenous populations; and fourth, 
recommendations regarding both Chinese policies and international foreign 
policy responses.  
These recommendations will suggest the usefulness of the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples as a framework and 
recommend the 2008 Tibetan Memorandum as a negotiating document that 
approximates these international standards. That recommendation will 
encourage a Chinese path that embodies the same spirit of inventiveness that it 
employed in creating the “one country, two systems” model now applied in 
Hong Kong and Macau and proposed for Taiwan. Such approach would enable 
China to shape a hybrid Tibetan solution that achieves the genuine autonomy 
embraced by the Tibetan Memorandum. The present analysis will not question 
the Tibetan exile government’s formal stance on seeking autonomy versus 
independence, as this is a question with both substantive and strategic 
implications for Tibetans to decide. 
A China that employs its rising power to repress indigenous and other 
internal populations and to intimidate its neighbors cannot help but pay an 
international price in suspicion and criticism for such aggressive stance. In this 
sense, Tibet has always been part of a larger policy concern that stretches 
beyond border security and internal resources. For China, seeing Tibet in limited 
security terms has been costly. With China’s rise—and increasing global reach 
and potential—this price can only increase. In this sense, a viable solution to the 
Tibet problem may contribute to the effort to address wider peripheral concerns 
beyond Tibet, including even the Uyghur case. In moving forward in this regard 
China may also acquire a gentler less threatening face in its other international 
endeavors, reducing concerns currently associated with China’s rise. Since the 
Chinese Government has rejected suggestions for a more moderate Tibet 
stance, realization of such policy objectives is likely to require international 
diplomatic engagement along similar policy lines for some time to come. 
 
The Current Impasse: 
China’s Reaction to Recent Tibetan Disturbances and Discussions 
 
The March 2008 Tibetan uprising, the subsequent Chinese crackdown 
and the international protests that followed the Olympic torch attracted 
considerable international concern, embarrassing Chinese officials as they 
prepared to host the 2008 Beijing Olympics. Beijing faced considerable 
international pressure to meet with the Dalai Lama’s representatives and resolve 
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this long-standing dispute. 5  Though Chinese officials quickly moved into 
damage control, their subsequent actions and statements raise doubt about their 
intentions. The approach taken seemed aimed at putting out the immediate fire 
until the Olympics had passed and then bringing the Tibet problem under firm 
control. This mode of proceeding has long plagued Chinese policies in its 
periphery and has long attracted skepticism about its intentions in areas it 
identifies as core interests. Chinese officials quickly held an informal meeting 
with the Dalai Lama’s representatives in Shenzhen near Hong Kong in May of 
2008 and scheduled the seventh and eighth rounds in their ongoing formal 
dialogue to begin in July and late October that year, a time line just sufficient to 
get past the Beijing Olympics.  
While international leaders and diplomats held out hope for substantive 
Sino-Tibetan dialogue, the marching orders for Chinese representatives were 
clearly more limited. They merely reiterated China’s long-standing official 
position that Sino-Tibetan “contacts and dialogues were about the Dalai Lama's 
personal future, and not so-called "China-Tibet negotiation" or "dialogue 
between Han and Tibetan people."6 They insisted on three “stops” to: “stop 
activities aimed at splitting China, stop plotting and inciting violence and stop 
disrupting and sabotaging the Beijing Olympic Games.” This was later refined 
to “four non-supports”: “not to support activities to disturb the upcoming 
Beijing Olympic Games, not to support plots to fan violent criminal activities, 
not to support and concretely curb the violent terrorist activities of the "Tibetan 
Youth Congress" and not to support any argument and activity to seek "Tibet 
independence" and split the region from the country.” 7  The exiled Tibetan 
leadership has long met these conditions, and there is no record of the moderate 
Tibetan Youth Congress engaging in terrorist activities.  
Though their earlier efforts in the 1950s to win over the Dalai Lama’s 
support belie such claim, Chinese officials dismissively challenged the Dalai 
Lama’s credentials to represent the Tibetan people, insisting that he must speak 
to the central government as a “common person.”8 They launched vociferous 
personal attacks on the Dalai Lama, labeling him a “wolf in monk’s robes.” All 
branches of the exile Tibetan community were lumped together and castigated 
as the “Dalai clique.”9 Though these Chinese arguments are generally viewed 
with disdain around the globe, few foreign leaders have been willing to publicly 
confront the Chinese stand. Most substantive research to challenge the Chinese 
official position has been limited to private academic work with little official 
engagement. 
In response to a Chinese request made at the July 2008 Sino-Tibetan 
meeting, the Dalai Lama’s representatives in early November presented a formal 
Tibetan “Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People”                                                           
5 Willy Lam, “Beijing’s Post-Olympics Shakedown in Xinjiang and Tibet,” China Brief, Sept. 2008, 
pp. 2-4. 
6 “Chinese official urges Dalai Lama to respond with sincerity after recent contact,” Xinhua, 
Beijing, July 6, 2008. 
7 Ibid. 
8 “China unwilling to broach Tibet with Dalai Lama,” Indo-Asian News Service, Beijing, Tuesday, 
July 15, 2008. 
9 Michael C. Davis, “For Talks to Succeed China Must Admit to a Tibet Problem,” YaleGlobal 
Online, May 16, 2008. http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/talks-succeed-china-must-admit-tibet-
problem  
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outlining their argument for autonomy under the Chinese Constitution.10 The 
Tibetan Memorandum sets forth Tibetan “aspirations” for genuine autonomy 
and self-government in eleven policy areas, including language, culture, religion, 
education, environmental protection, utilization of natural resources, economic 
development and trade, public health, internal public security, population 
migration and cultural, educational, and religious exchanges with other 
countries. Unfulfilled national ethnic autonomy policies enacted under Article 4 
of the PRC Constitution already promise autonomy in nearly all of these areas. 
The exception may be those relating to immigration and external exchanges in 
the commercial and cultural areas, which appear instead to track policies similar 
to those applied under the PRC Constitution Article 31 “one country, two 
systems” formula. 
 There appears to be nothing in the law on national minority autonomy 
that would prohibit these extra protections in response to the unique local 
character, as allowed by the national minority law, discussed below. In the 
interest of self-government, the Tibetan Memorandum includes a specification 
that local laws within the scope of autonomy not be subject to central approval 
as is now required in minority areas under the Chinese national minority statute 
and that the terms of their agreement with the Central Government not be 
subject to the Central Government’s unilateral amendment. The Tibetans 
appear to recognize that too much Central oversight and manipulation has lead 
to the failure of the current autonomy policies. They further proposed to unify 
into one autonomous region the thirteen contiguous Tibetan areas that China 
has designated under its national minority autonomy laws. The Tibetan 
Memorandum acknowledges the continuing application of the Chinese socialist 
system within Tibet, though one may doubt whether that economic system 
persist in China today. 
 Finally, the Tibetan Memorandum acknowledges the authority of the 
National People’s Congress (NPC) and other organs of the Central Government 
and would accept application of the system of local people’s congresses with 
locally chosen representatives within the Tibetan autonomous area. The Tibetan 
Memorandum was presented as a starting position for further negotiation. 
These proposals track the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of 
Indigenous Peoples that China supported in the UN General Assembly. 
The Chinese response was quick and harsh. In an early November 2008 
Chinese State Council press conference, Mr. Zhu Weiqun of the United Front 
Works Department attacked the Tibetan position as essentially camouflage for 
independence.11 The accompanying State Council Address likened the Tibetan 
notion of “genuine autonomy” to the “high degree of autonomy” allowed Hong 
Kong. The Tibetans were accused of seeking “half-independence,” and “covert 
independence,” though no explanation is given why the same language applied 
to Hong Kong means only autonomy. The State Council Address further 
accuses the exiled Tibetans of “colluding with such dregs as ‘democracy 
activists,’ ‘falunkun (Falungong) elements’ and ‘Eastern Turkistan terrorists.’” 
The Tibetan proposal to gain control over immigration is likened to “ethnic                                                           
10 Tibetan Memorandum, supra note 3. 
11 Address at the Press Conference Press Conference by the State Council Office,” Beijing, Nov. 
10, 2008 (hereinafter “State Council Address”) (address given by Mr. Zhu Weiqun, Executive 
Vice-Minister of the United Front Work Department of the CPC Central Committee). The United 
Front Work Department is responsible for national minority affairs. 
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cleansing.” The exile government is said to be a “small group of splittists.” The 
meetings were essentially damage control, with some international public 
relations objectives, mostly aimed at persuading the Dalai Lama to “give up his 
splitting activities.” The State Council Address declared, “We never discussed 
the so-called ‘Tibet issue” and will “never make a concession.” Demonstrating 
even greater insensitivity to Tibetan concerns, in January 2009 the PRC created 
a new holiday to celebrate the “liberation” of Tibet which they have labeled 
“Serfs Emancipation Day.”12  
After the State Council Address the Dalai Lama’s representative 
published a note responding to these various criticisms and emphasizing that 
the type of self-governing autonomy sought in the Tibetan Memorandum is 
consistent with both the PRC Constitution and the practice of autonomy 
around the world—that posed no risk to the sovereignty of the country.13 They 
emphasized that there was a difference of opinion on history and that this 
should be no “obstacle to seeking a mutually beneficial common future within 
the PRC.”14 The Tibetan exile movement also convened a large Special Meeting 
of the Tibetans in Diaspora in Dharamsala, India in mid-November, 2008 where 
Tibetans expressed doubts about Chinese intentions but resolved to continue 
efforts at achieving genuine autonomy under the Middle-Way approach.15  
Presently, things remain at an impasse, with Chinese efforts to control 
opposition in Tibet and isolate the Dalai Lama continuing. Offering no 
concessions regarding the character of autonomy, the Chinese Government in 
its 2009 White Paper on Tibet claims that autonomy is already provided under 
existing national minority laws.16 This essentially means no autonomy at all. In 
these discussions the Tibetan side, being the least empowered, has made the 
most concessions, including deference to Chinese demands regarding 
sovereignty. The quid pro quo for this concession is supposed to be “genuine 
autonomy” under a formula they have labeled the “Middle Way” approach.17 
The Tibetan exile leaders clearly appreciate the relative weakness of their 
bargaining position. Their hope is that such autonomy will promote both 
democracy and human rights in Tibet.18 There is urgency to the Tibetan cause 
both as to ongoing repression and to secure their long-term survival. With 
increasing Chinese immigration into Tibet, Tibetans are concerned that the 1.3                                                           
12 “Tibet Sets ‘Serfs Emancipation Day,’” Xinhua, Jan. 19, 2009, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-01/19/content_7410293.htm 
13 Note on the Memorandum on Genuine Autonomy for the Tibetan People, Dharamsala, India, 
Jam. 2010. http://www.tibetpolicy.eu/resource-center/official-documents/321-note-on-the-
memorandum-on-genuine-autonomy-for-the-tibetan-people  
14 Ibid., p. 3. 
15 Ibid., p. 2. See also, “China’s Communist Regime Losing Ground,” Agencies, Jan. 16, 2008. 
http://news.outlookindia.com/items.aspx?artid=651926  
16White Paper on “Fifty Years of Democratic Reform in Tibet” (hereinafter “2009 White Paper”), 
Information Office of the State Council of the PRC, March 2009, Beijing. 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-03/02/content_7527376.htm Interview with Chinese 
Officials Liu Hongji (and Wang Xiaobin), Tibetology Research Center, Beijing, Aug. 25, 2006. 
17 The Dalai Lama began to articulate his “middle way” position in speeches in the 1980s before 
the US Congress and before the European Parliament. Address to Members of the United States 
Congress: Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet, Sept. 21, 1987; Address to Members of the European 
Parliament by His Holiness the Dalai Lama, June 15, 1988. See The Middle-Way Approach, A 
Framework for Resolving the Issue of Tibet, Department of Information and Public Relations, 
CTA Dharamsala, 2006. http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=115&rmenuid=11  
18 Interview with HH the Dalai Lama, Dharamsala, India, Aug. 9, 2006.  
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billion Chinese may eventually swamp the 5.5 million Tibetans in the vast 
mountainous regions of Tibet, leaving them a minority in their own land.19 By 
some estimates this has already happened in the Tibetan cities.20 The spate of 
Tibetan self-immolations in 2011 and 2012 have added urgency to this impasse. 
 
Historical Claims and Present Practice in Tibet 
 
 While the Dalai Lama has gone to great lengths to avoid a discussion of 
Sino-Tibetan history in his formal discussions with the Chinese Government, 
history has lurked in the background of nearly all Chinese claims. The Dalai 
Lama takes the view that agreement on history is not possible without 
misrepresentation, as he proclaims a willingness to work out an autonomy 
arrangement in the shadow of the present reality. China, on the other hand, has 
not been shy about reinterpreting history to justify present practice, especially 
when there are doubts about the legitimacy of its position. This has led it to 
advance a claim of ancient title and “liberation” with respect to Tibet that the 
Dalai Lama disputes. At a general level this dispute appears less a battle over the 
historical narrative than its interpretation. There are two parts to this dispute: 
historical title and present practice. 
 
 “Tibet has been an inseparable part of China since ancient times.” 21  
 
Assessing the Historical Sino-Tibetan Relationship. Though Chinese officials 
are fond of repeating the above statement, a closer look reveals a more nuanced 
story and hardly one that would sufficiently justify present-day sovereignty.22 
The general disrepute of imperial claims would alone call into question present-
day sovereignty claims based on historical empire. But the factual record of the 
Tibetan case raises further question, as Chinese efforts at imperial conquest met 
Tibetan resistance for nearly a thousand years. This historical record does 
highlight the special character of the historical Sino-Tibetan relationship and 
may offer a yardstick by which to assess current autonomy obligations.  
Imperial China often faced external threats on its western borders and 
attempted to neutralize these threats by conquering and assimilating its 
neighbors. Though Tibet was sometimes a target of such efforts, its remote 
mountain location made it less of a threat and inhibited Chinese efforts at 
conquest. After Tibet’s own imperial age during the Chinese Tang Dynasty, it 
rarely posed sufficient threat to justify a costly conquest and direct rule. 23 
Rather, a loose imperial association prevailed. It was only during the last 
Chinese dynasty, the Qing, in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, that                                                           
19  Tabulations on Nationalities of 2000 Population Census of China (Beijing: Nationalities 
Publishing House, 2003). Available at http://www.purpleculture.net/tabulation-on-the-2000-
population-census-of-the-peoples-republic-of-china-3-volumes-p-753/  
20 See June Teufel Dreyer, “Economic Development in Tibet Under the People’s Republic of 
China,” in Barry Sautman and June Teufel Dreyer, eds. Contemporary Tibet: Politics, Development and 
Society in a Disputed Region (London: M.E. Sharpe, 2006), at pp. 129-151, 139; Anne-Marie Blondeau 
and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet, Answers to China’s 100 Questions (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 2008) (comments by Andrew M. Fischer), pp. 144-151. 
21 2009 White Paper, supra note 17. 
22  Eliot Sperling, The Tibet-China Conflict: History and Polemics (Washington: East West Center, 
Policies Studies 7, 2004). 
23 See Christopher I. Beckwith, Tibetan Empire in Central Asia, 24, 167 (1987). 
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military invasion and imperial occupation sometimes occurred. Even then Tibet 
was treated as a vassal state and part of China’s external empire subject to 
indirect rule. 24 Eliot Sperling identifies China’s claim that Tibet was always an 
inseparable part of China as a late twentieth century invention.25  
Present-day Chinese accounts usually date China’s claimed 
incorporation of Tibet to the Mongol-ruled Yuan Dynasty (1270-1368). The 
Tibetan abbot Sakya Pandita is reported to have subordinated Tibet to the 
emerging Mongol Empire in 1247AD. With some initial Tibetan resistance, the 
Mongols invaded and establish administrative control in 1267. It was 
subsequent to this in 1270 that the Mongol King, Kubilai Khan, proclaimed the 
Yuan Dynasty in China. Even then China was administered separately from 
Tibet among the Mongol’s conquest.26  
Warren Smith describes a carefully calibrated diplomatic relationship 
from the Yuan Dynasty forward between China’s emperors and ruling Tibetan 
lamas. Imperial attempts at subordination would be matched with Tibetan 
resistance.27 In the Yuan Dynasty, leading Tibetan lamas served in a religious 
advisory role for the Mongol emperors—a role characterized by the Tibetans as 
a Cho-yon or patron-priest relationship.28 During the succeeding Chinese Ming 
Dynasty (1368-1644) this relationship persisted, though the Ming court seemed 
to value Tibetan lamas more for their intermediary role in dealing with the still 
threatening Mongols. The succeeding Manchu dominated Qing Dynasty (1636-
1910) featured the highest level of Chinese intervention and sometimes 
conquest in Tibet, though no serious incorporation of a Tibet that remained 
separate from China. Complex interplay and protocol would offer the emperor’s 
support for rule in Tibet by the Gelugpa Buddhist sect under the Dalai Lama.29 
In the eighteenth century, the expanding Qing intruded more and more on 
Tibetan autonomy. By 1720, under the Emperor Kang Hsi, the Qing occupied 
and ruled Tibet, though the Qing garrison was withdrawn when he died in 1722. 
Such occupation was restored later and off and on in the decades to follow. 
During its occupations, to advance its efforts at indirect rule the Qing set in 
place a permanent government under a Tibetan Kashag or council. The Qing 
was also represented in Lhasa by its Amban. Qing control always involved at 
most indirect imperial rule, with central Tibet considered part of the Qing’s 
“exterior empire.”30  
 From 1911 until the PRC occupation in 1950, Tibet was de facto 
independent. To justify their invasion and occupation, Chinese officials claim 
Tibet during this period was hopelessly feudal and savage.31 One doubts that                                                           
24 Pamela Crossley, A Translucent Mirror: History and Identity in Qing Imperial Ideology (University of 
California, 1999) at 327-336; Sperling, supra, note 24, at 28-30. Both Crossley and Sperling note 
that these areas fell not under the Qing civil government but under the Court of Colonial Affairs 
(lifan yuan).   
25 Ibid., p. 28. 
26 Warren W. Smith, Jr., Tibetan Nation: A History of Tibetan Nationalism and Sino-Tibetan Relations 
(Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1996), pp. 83-100. 
27 Ibid.  
28 Sperling, supra note 23, pp. 30-31. 
29 Ibid. pp. 111-112. The title “Dalai Lama” was introduced during the Ming Dynasty by a Mongol 
leader Altan Khan, designating Sonam Gyatso, the abbot of the Drepung monastery, the third 
Dalai Lama. Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet, supra, note 21, 
pp. 35-36. The word Dalai derives from the Mongolian word Tale, for oceans.  
30 Smith, Tibetan Nation, supra note 27, pp. 121, 134-138, 145, 151. 
31 2009 White Paper, supra note 3. 
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feudal Tibet suffered from any worse conditions than its Asian neighbors. 
Commentators contest recent Chinese claims of systematic savagery and 
serfdom. 32  Even Melvyn Goldstein, who is often cited in Chinese official 
accounts, notes that Tibetan serfs “were not necessarily downtrodden.” 33  It 
seemed that Tibet had a traditional land-based economy with hierarchical social 
structures that are not uncommon in such systems.34 At this time, Tibet also 
began the first stages of political modernization. With a council or cabinet called 
the Kashag in place since the late Qing Dynasty, Tibetans had in the 1860s 
introduced a national assembly or Tshongdu, which included representatives of 
Lhasa’s monasteries and secular officials.35 In recent Tibetan exile a form of 
liberal constitutional democracy has emerged, including universal suffrage in the 
exile community, a directly elected prime minister served by a cabinet or 
Kashag, a Supreme Justice Commission, and an elected Assembly of Tibetan 
People’s Deputies.36 The Dalai Lama has recently withdrawn from temporal rule 
in favor of the elected Prime Minister, a situation he promises will persist in 
some agreed form in an autonomous Tibet.37 
The period of de facto independence also witnessed the introduction of 
the language of modern statehood and sovereignty. In negotiations with Tibet 
and British India, Republican Chinese officials generally acknowledged that 
Tibet had a special status with only Chinese indirect rule. In negotiations at 
Simla, India in 1913, the British advanced a notion, similar to that which China 
had accepted for Mongolia, of inner and outer Tibet. This distinguished a largely 
independent central Tibet under Chinese suzerainty from a subordinate Eastern 
Tibet under Chinese sovereignty. All parties initialed the Simla Convention, 
accepting this view, though the Chinese ultimately did not ratify it, as they were 
dissatisfied with the stipulated boundary between inner and outer Tibet.38 In 
various other negotiations in the 1930s, China acknowledged Tibet’s high degree 
of autonomy under nominal Chinese rule. The United States and Britain early 
on tended to characterize Chinese imperial territorial claims as suzerainty.39 
As the Dalai Lama explains it, when the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) invaded Tibet in 1951, he faced an offer he could not refuse for Tibet to                                                           
32 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments of Robert 
Barnett), supra note 21, pp. 81-84. 
33 Melvyn C. Goldstein, A History of Modern Tibet, 1913-1951 (University of California Press, 1989), 
p. 5. 
34 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments of Katia 
Buffetrille), supra note 21, at pp. 293-298. 
35 Ibid., pp. 10-31. 
36 Lobsang Sangay, “Tibet: Exiles Journey,” Journal of Democracy, Vol. 14, No. 3 (2003), pp. 119-
130. 
37 Guidelines for Future Tibet’s Polity and the Basic Features of the Constitution, Feb. 26, 1992 
http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=101&rmenuid=11 ; The Middle-way Approach, supra 
note 18. The 2011 election in the Tibetan diaspora resulted in election of legal academic Lobsang 
Sangay as the first lay Prime Minister or Kalon Tripa. Abhishek Madhukar, “Exiled Tibetans elect 
political heir to Dalai Lama, Reuters,” April 27, 2011. 
38 Goldstein, supra, note 34, pp. 68-80, 832-841.   
39 “(A) distinctive element of the feudal suzerainty relationship is that the suzerain holds the 
source of the governmental authority of the vassal state whose ruler he grants the right to exercise 
the authority autonomously,” Michael C. van Walt van Praag, The Status of Tibet (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1987), pp. 105-06. See also United States Policy Concerning the Legal Status of 
Tibet, 1942-1956, Historical Division, Department of State, Research Project No. 403, November, 
1957, US National Archives 793B.oo/11-157. 
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become part of the PRC.40  With weak international support to do otherwise, he 
accepted a Seventeen-Point Agreement “on Measures for the Peaceful 
Liberation of Tibet.”41 The Chinese, at the time, appeared more concerned with 
gaining territory and resisting outside imperialism than with saving Tibetans 
from feudal poverty. As the only treaty-like agreement with any of its purported 
national minorities, the 17-point agreement acknowledged the special status of 
Tibet and promised autonomy under Tibet’s indigenous system of self-rule. 
Early on China failed to keep these special commitments, pushing Tibet toward 
“democratic reform.” 
 Chafing under the thumb of their new cadre rulers in March of 1959 
Tibetans rebelled and the Dalai Lama fled Tibet. 42  This brought to an end 
centuries of Tibetan self-rule. On March 28, 1959, after the Dalai Lama’s 
departure, China dismissed the local government and for the first time in history 
established direct Chinese rule over all of Tibet.  The Preparatory Committee 
for the Tibet Autonomous Region (PCTAR), which had been established under 
the Dalai Lama’s earlier formal chairmanship, was declared the official 
governing body.43 In September 1965 the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) was 
proclaimed under the first People’s Congress of the TAR. Under the national 
minority laws, Tibet no longer enjoys a special status, being lumped together 
with fifty-five designated “national minorities.”  
The PRC’s Practice of Autonomy in Tibet. China’s national minority 
autonomy policies applied in Tibet and throughout the country are promulgated 
in the current 1982 PRC Constitution44 and in the Law on Regional National 
Autonomy (LRNA) passed in 1984, and revised in 2001.45 Article 4 of PRC 
Constitution provides that, “Regional autonomy is practiced in areas where 
people of minority nationalities live in concentrated communities.”  Under 
LRNA Article 15 autonomous areas carry out their role “under the unified 
leadership of the State Council and shall be subordinate to it.” The LRNA 
promises national minority autonomy in respect of language, education, political 
representation, administrative appointments, local economic and financial 
policies, and the use of local natural resources. Effective exercise of such 
promised autonomy is in doubt. These laws are narrowly applied and allow 
substantial intrusion of central control and the national political system into 
local affairs. They contrast sharply with the flexible approach under PRC 
Constitution Article 31, as applied in Hong Kong and Macau.  
The 1982 PRC Constitution, passed during China’s liberalizing phase, 
appears to offer enhanced local autonomy. Along with the LRNA, it includes 
the power, subject to higher approval, to enact “regulations on the exercise of 
autonomy (zizhi tiaoli) and other separate regulations (danxing tiaoli) in light of 
                                                          
40  Dalai Lama, Freedom in Exile, The Autobiography of the Dalai Lama (HarperCollins 
Publishers, 1991), p. 64; Goldstein, supra note 34, pp. 798-803. 
41 Seventeen-point Agreement, supra note 4. See Goldstein, supra note 34, p. 759-772. 
42 Dalai Lama, supra note 41, p. 136. 
43 Preparatory Committee for the Tibetan Autonomous Region (PCTAR), Established in April 
1956. 
44 PRC Constitution (1982), Articles 4, 59, 65, 89 and 112-122. 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/constitution/constitution.html  
45 Law of the People’s Republic of China on Regional National Autonomy (hereinafter LRNA), 
1984, revised 2001. http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2007-04/13/content_1207139.ht  
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the political, economic and cultural characteristics.” 46  “Regulations on the 
exercise of autonomy” have the status of a sub-constitution or basic law and it is 
expected that one such regulation will be enacted in each autonomous area.47 
The required higher approval must typically come from the next higher level of 
government, for autonomous regions the Central Government and for 
autonomous prefectures and counties the provincial government. None of the 
PRC’s five autonomous regions: Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Guangxi, and 
Ningxia, have received approval for such basic regulation on the exercise of 
autonomy. The one attempt at enacting a basic regulation on the exercise of 
autonomy in the Tibetan Autonomous Region (TAR) went through 15 drafts 
and was eventually abandoned without being submitted to the State Council.48 
Various autonomous prefectures and counties have received approval from 
provincial governments for basic autonomy laws that largely track the LRNA 
content. Autonomous regions and other areas have enacted many “separate 
regulations.”49 A third category would be ordinary laws unrelated to autonomy, 
which do not require such higher approval.50 
Chinese communism and Communist Party (CCP) control offers an 
even more daunting challenge to autonomy. This is especially evident in the 
legislative drafting process. Chunli Xia describes a complex system of CCP 
oversight of the legislative drafting process with numerous approvals required 
from various CCP party committees at each stage of the process.51 Given the 
center’s control over the CCP and the fact that top party officials always come 
from the center there is little room for local legislative initiative. 52  The 
imposition is further bolstered by the party’s Marxist ideology, which denigrates 
Tibetan claims by denying the essential character of China’s policies in Tibet. 
The CCP characterizes the 1950 occupation of Tibet as “liberation” and the 
institution of CCP rule as “democratic reform.” This Marxist logic views 
colonialism as only a product of capitalist exploitation. Since China never 
reached the stage of full capitalist development it could not have colonized 
Tibet. Instead, China “liberated” the exploited classes of Tibet under a Chinese 
“internal multinational system,” in a “common program” of local autonomous 
rule. 53  Autonomy was merely a temporary solution on the path to ultimate 
assimilation.54 The CCP clearly envisioned that “the local Government of Tibet                                                           
46 PRC Constitution (1982), supra note 45, Article 116; LRNA, supra note 47, Article 19. Such 
provision is repeated in Article 66 of the Legislative Law. 
47 Ibid., p. 10.  
48 Yash Ghai and Sophia Woodman, “Unused Power: Contestation Over Autonomy Legislation in 
the PRC,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 82/1, 2009, pp. 29-46, at 39-40. 
49 Separate regulations are made by autonomous legislative bodies on specific topics such as 
language, marriage, family planning, etc.  
50 See Chunli Xia, Autonomous Legislative Power in Regional Ethnic Autonomy of the People’s 
Republic of China: The Law and the Reality,” in J. Oliveira and P. Cardinal, eds., One Country, Two 
Systems, Three Legal Orders: Perspectives of Evolution (Berlin and Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag, 2009), 
pp. 541-564 (citing Organic Law of the People’s Republic of China, Article 7 and the Legislative 
Law, Article 63).  
51 Ibid.  
52 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments by Thierry 
Dodin), supra note 21, pp. 191-196. 
53 Common Program of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Committee (1949).  
54 Warren W. Smith, jr.,    China's Tibet, supra note 2, at 233. Chinese officials cite advanced 
technology and modern communications to justify direct rule. Interview with Liu Hongji, supra 
note 17. 
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should carry out “reform” voluntarily.”55 Such a system was, in fact, imposed 
after the 1959 uprising when the Dalai Lama fled.  
After the 1959 Tibetan uprising, all forms of traditional political 
structure were quickly eliminated. The indigenous form of government 
promised in the 1951 Seventeen-point Agreement did not survive. The 
replication of the national political structures in minority areas has made them 
highly susceptible to top-down central administrative control. The Cultural 
Revolution (1966-1976) was an especially severe period of hard-line class 
struggle and massive cultural destruction across China. In the early 1980s, after 
Chinese Premier Hu Yaobang observed especially dire conditions in Tibet, a 
remorseful China briefly pursued a policy of liberalization. As Tibetans became 
more outspoken in the slightly more liberal environment this was followed by 
even greater repression and martial law, as hardliners in the Beijing regime 
concluded that liberalization had encouraged greater resistance. In the recent 
decade, a policy of cracking down on political support for the Dalai Lama has 
included so-called “patriotic education” and greater emphasis on economic 
development under which Chinese immigration has been favored.56 Today only 
Hong Kong and Macau retain a distinctive form of local self-rule. 
Chinese repression has taken many forms, including military occupation 
and crackdowns, the sacking and razing of Buddhist monasteries, suppression of 
religion, coerced “reeducation” of monks and nuns, imprisonment of dissidents, 
and the forced relocation of rural dwellers and herders to more populated areas. 
Monks and nuns have especially resisted coercion to renounce the Dalai Lama.57 
Popular dissent and rebellion famously arose in 1959, 1989 and 2008. Increased 
tensions in Tibet, most recently evident in a rash of more than thirty self-
immolations over the past two years, bear out the continued Tibetan frustration 
with Chinese policies.58  
Both the Chinese government and its critics have issued reports on 
Chinese policies in Tibet. The March 2009 Chinese White Paper on “Fifty Years 
of Democratic Reform in Tibet” highlights favorable statistics on Tibetan 
participation in autonomous governance, including: Tibetans and other 
minorities holding 94 percent of the seats in local people’s congresses; a 96.4 
percent voter turnout rate for participation in the electoral process; Tibetan and 
other ethnic minority deputies holding 77 percent of the staff positions in state 
organs at the regional, prefectural and county levels; and a claim of Tibetan 
occupation of the top positions of various autonomous governments and 
standing committees.59 At the time of the report 12 of the 20 deputies from the 
TAR to the National People’s Congress were Tibetan. The report states that the 
                                                          
55 2009 White Paper, supra note 17, p. 1. 
56 Warren W. Smith, Jr., “China’s Policy on Tibetan Autonomy,” East-West Center Washington 
Working Papers, No. 2, October 2004. 
57 Interview with President, Gu Chu Sun Movement of Tibet (Association of former Political 
Prisoners), Dharamsala, Aug. 3, 2006; Interview of “Singing Nun” Renchen Choeky, Dharamsala, 
Aug. 4, 2006 (Sentenced to prison for demonstrating in protest in Lhasa; and sentenced again 
while in prison when 18 nuns produced a singing recording that was smuggled out) 
58 “Teen sets himself on fire ‘for Tibet,’” South China Morning Post, Oct. 17, 2011, p. A7; Ng Tze-
wei, “Tibetan Nun Burns to Death,” South China Morning Post, Oct. 19, 2011, p. A6. 
59 2009 White Paper, supra note 17. 
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Tibetan language is taught in the schools, and widely used along with the 
Chinese language—though critics worry this is mostly at the primary level.60  
Even that has come under threat, with recent reports of Tibetan 
demonstrations against reported Chinese efforts in Qinghai autonomous areas 
to replace Tibetan with Chinese as the primary language of instruction in 
primary schools.61 The Chinese report also emphasizes China’s contribution to 
Tibet’s economic development, though critics worry that these policies benefit 
Chinese more than Tibetans. 62  The bulk of the report emphasizes China’s 
“liberation” of Tibet and its “democratic reform.” Though the liberation was 
stated to be from “foreign imperial forces,” the text of the report lays greater 
empirical emphasis on liberation from Tibetans themselves, accusing the 
traditional Tibetan elites of horrific feudal practices. No attempt is made to 
explain why China should assume the role of modernizing Tibet. The claimed 
democratic reform is not much explained, overlooking China’s own lack of 
democratic reform. 
A 1997 report of the International Commission of Jurist (ICJ) notes 
that while “Tibetans are in positions of nominal authority, they are often 
shadowed by more powerful Chinese officials” and that “every local organ is 
shadowed by a CCP committee or ‘leading group.’”63 A 2007 report by Minority 
Rights Group International and Human Rights in China highlights several 
deficiencies, including the centralization of power in the top leadership of the 
CCP; the above concerns with the law-making process, Chinese dominance of 
CCP leadership in minority areas, including Chinese officials from the center 
always holding the top CCP post, and the lack of real power at the local level.64 
Of particular concern for the deeply religious Tibetan nationality, is a CCP rule 
that bars party members from practicing Tibetan Buddhism and a recently 
added rule that cadres withdraw their children from Tibetan schools in India.65 
Particularly puzzling has been the formal claim by the avowedly atheist Chinese 
government to choose the next reincarnation of the Dalai Lama and other 
leading lamas, which recently moved the Dalai Lama to issue his own formal 
statement making clear his own plans for reincarnation or emanation 
challenging any Chinese official role in this.66 
                                                           
60 See Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds. Authenticating Tibet (comments by Amy 
Heller and Anne-Marie Blondeau), supra note 21, p. 235. 
61 Edward Wong, “Tibetans in China Protest Proposed Curbs on Their Language,” New York 
Times, Oct. 22, 2010. 
62 Anne-Marie Blondeau and Katia Buffetrille, eds., Authenticating Tibet, supra, note 21  (comments 
by Andrew M. Fischer), pp. 250-277. Fischer worries that the current subsidies tends to benefit 
Chinese officials and large Chinese construction companies, while creating dependency—what he 
calls the boomerang effect. Ibid., p. 269. Fischer sees greater productivity if Tibetans are left to 
traditional herding and farming. Ibid., p. 275.  
63 Tibet: Human Rights and the Rule of Law (Geneva: International Commission of Jurists, 1997), pp. 
14–21. 
64  Human Rights in China and Minority Rights Group International, China: Exclusion, 
Marginalization and Rising Tension (Minority Rights Group International, 2007). Available at 
http://hrichina.org/public/PDFs/MRG-HRIC.China.Report.pdf . 
65 Kristine Kwok, “Officials to be sacked for sending their children to ‘Dalai Lama Schools,’” 
South China Morning Post, July 18, 2006. 
66 Statement of His Holiness the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, on the Issue of His 
Reincarnation, Sept. 24, 2011. http://dalailama.com/messages/tibet/reincarnation-statement For 
the Beijing response, see Zhuang Pinghui, “We choose next Dalai Lama says Beijing,” South China 
Morning Post, 27 Sept.2011.  
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International Legal Standards 
 
Self-determination of peoples is grounded in the UN Charter and in the 
international human rights covenants, though these sources offer little guidance 
on who are the peoples entitled to such right. International law generally 
distinguishes between external and internal rights of self-determination.67 When 
the external right, which is thought to include a right of secession, is effectively 
denied, justified or not, then the internal right may be all that survives.68 This 
typically involves some notion of autonomy, though autonomy has not enjoyed 
very strong protection in international law.69 It may be argued, however, that in 
two circumstances autonomy becomes effectively internationalized: 1) when it is 
the consequence of treaty arrangements or 2) when it arises out of the denial of 
rights of self-determination, especially of indigenous peoples. The Tibet case 
includes both. The Seventeen-point Agreement reflects a treaty arrangement and 
Tibetans appear to be indigenous people or at least similarly situated. 
For indigenous populations, human rights, self-determination and 
autonomy acquired greater international traction in the 2007 UN Declaration on 
the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.70 The Declaration provides the substantive 
content of internal autonomy. While UN declarations are generally not binding 
as such, the nearly unanimous passage (143 to 4 with eleven abstentions) of the 
Indigenous People’s Declaration along with its purported declaration of existing 
customary law may strengthen its binding effect. 71 The Chinese government 
voted for the declaration but claims there are no indigenous peoples in China,72 
claiming 5,000 years of national unity and harmony with minorities living on 
their own lands.73  
While the UN Declaration does not define “indigenous peoples,” it 
does specify that they exist throughout the world.74 A separate 1986 UN study                                                           
67 See Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 1960 
UNGA Resolution 1514 (XV), 15 UN Gaor, Supp. (No. 16), UN Doc. A/4684 (1960), p. 66; 
Declarations on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation 
Among States, 1970 UNGA Resolution 2625 (XXV), Annex, 25 UN Gaor, Supp. (No. 28), UN 
Doc. A/5217 (1970), at 121. The Human Rights Covenants in their first article guarantee “all 
peoples” the right to “freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, 
social and cultural rights.” International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, December 16, 
1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S.  3. As a party to the ICESCR China is bound by this. 
68 Reference re Secession of Quebec, (1998) 161 DLR (4th) p. 385, Supreme Court of Canada. 
69 D. Sanders, “Is Autonomy a Principle of International Law,” 55 Nordic Journal of International 
Law 17 (1986); F. L. Kirgis, “The Degrees of Self-determination in the UN Era,” 88 American 
Journal of International Law 310 (1994); Hans-Joachim Heintze, “Evolution of Autonomy and 
Federalism,” in Oliveira and Cardinal, supra, note 51, pp. 389-408. 
70  UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, (hereinafter “Indigenous People’s 
Declaration) 
http://www.tebtebba.org/tebtebba_files/ipr/undrip/OfficialResolution/A61L.67%20eng.pdf.  
71 Ibid. Opposing the Declaration were the United States, Canada, New Zealand and Australia.  
72 “China Concerned with Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights,” Embassy of the People’s 
Republic of China in Switzerland, 1997/04/01, http://ch.China-
embassy.org/eng/ztnr/rqwt/t138829.htm 
73 Speech of Chinese Representative Group Deputy Tong Zhihwa, Human Rights Council, 1st 
Meeting, 11th Drafting Session. 
http://www.docip.org/HumanRightsCouncil/sessions1/cddh1_5.pdf .  
74 There are thought to be over 370 million indigenous people worldwide. “UN adopts declaration 
on rights for indigenous peoples worldwide,” International Herald Tribune, Sept. 13, 2007. 
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defined indigenous peoples as “communities, […] which, having a historical 
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their 
territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now 
prevailing[...].”75 It also emphasized that such communities consider themselves 
distinct from the dominant sector. The Tibetan people, even in China’s own 
accounts in the 2009 White Paper, clearly satisfy these criteria of distinctiveness 
as to language, culture and history. Whatever its legal status, this UN 
Declaration can clearly serve as a useful guide to measure Chinese policies 
discussed above.  
The UN Declaration’s preliminary articles emphasize demilitarization of 
indigenous lands; the right of indigenous people to freely determine their 
relationship with states; that treaties, agreements and constructive arrangements 
with states are matters of international concern; “the fundamental importance of 
the right of self-determination of all peoples, by virtue of which they freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and 
cultural development;” and that the right to exercise self-determination in 
conformity with international law shall not be denied.  
The operative articles of the Declaration guarantee indigenous peoples: 
the right of self-determination;76 the right to autonomy or self-government in 
matters relating to their internal and local affairs; 77  the right to manifest, 
practice, develop and teach their spiritual and religious traditions, customs and 
ceremonies, including access in privacy to their religious and cultural sites and 
control of their ceremonial objects;78 the right to participate in decision making 
in matters which would affect their rights, through representatives chosen by 
themselves in accordance with their own procedures;79 the right to be consulted 
and prior consent through their own representative institutions before 
implementing state legislative and administrative measures;80 and the right to 
recognition, observance and enforcement of treaties, agreements and other 
constructive arrangements. At the same time they are guaranteed the rights 
protected by the various human rights treaties and covenants. China’s 
imposition of top-down CCP control under its national political system and its 
weak protection of basic human rights clearly falls greatly short of these 
standards of indigenous self-rule. 
 
A Recommended Path Forward 
 
The spirit of self-determination articulated above, in conjunction with 
Tibet’s centuries-long tradition of self-rule and autonomy, clearly calls for 
substantive change in China’s Tibet policy. That same spirit suggests that the 
Tibetan indigenous leadership be consulted over the policy direction. The 
Tibetan Memorandum offers initial guidance. The good news is that the Chinese 
Constitution already offers the tools in various articles on autonomy for a                                                           
75 United Nations Economic and Social Council, UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Jose Martinez Coho, Study of the Problem of 
Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/21/Add.8. 
(hereinafter “UN Working Group Report”)  
76 Indigenous People’s Declaration, supra note 71, Article 3. 
77 Ibid., Article 4. 
78 Ibid., Article 12. 
79 Ibid., Article 18. 
80 Ibid., Article 19. 
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flexible approach to the Tibet question. A flexible approach that fully 
implements China’s national minority laws, supplemented where appropriate 
with guarantees already applied under the “one country, two systems” formula, 
can surely be judged acceptable within China’s constitutional framework.  
Foreign ministries concerned with this issue should encourage precisely 
this approach using the Tibetan Memorandum as a point of takeoff. While 
China has traditionally objected to foreign interference, it clearly places great 
stock in foreign approval of its newly claimed status as a responsible leading 
state. Recognition of China’s status surely warrants a reciprocal right to 
comment on what should be expected of a leading country in respect to basic 
human rights. China’s leading trading partners, such as the United States and 
Europe should use their good offices to emphasize this connection. 
While the PRC Government has long taken a strident view that is hyper-
concerned that relaxing its Tibet polices will threaten national security, this view 
seems unfounded. A confident and secure Tibetan community within China 
would surely offer China greater security than a distraught and downtrodden 
community effectively under military occupation. In the Dalai Lama, the 
Chinese Government faces a reasonable and influential interlocutor who may 
assist them greatly to address their security concerns with a workable model that 
would, on his agreement, be accepted by both the Tibetan and international 
communities. This would be especially true with a model based on the standards 
articulated in the UN Declaration, for which the Tibetan Memorandum is a 
reasonably close fit. At the same time a workable model in Tibet would offer a 
very useful model for addressing the Xinjiang and other peripheral problems, 
each with attention to the unique local character in an asymmetric association.  
In some respects, China’s own political reforms nationwide appear to be 
held hostage to its concerns about losing control over its peripheral areas. A 
strong repressive center is seemingly thought necessary to hold the country 
together. Given peripheral tensions and little success at achieving the internal 
political reform conducive to China’s continuing development a change of 
approach seems warranted. As the Hong Kong model is sometimes advanced as 
a possible solution to the Taiwan problem, an agreeable Tibet model could be 
offered as a solution in Xinjiang and possibly Inner Mongolia. In addition to 
freeing up the path to domestic reform, these arrangements may likewise 
eliminate some of China’s stickiest foreign policy challenges. The Hong Kong 
model was the product of a confident and inventive Chinese leadership. That 
inventiveness is again sorely needed. At present Tibet and Taiwan are problems 
at the heart of nearly every foreign policy outing. More magnanimous gestures 
by China to address these problems may open the door to China normalizing its 
international relations and achieving more solid international standing. While the 
offer of genuine autonomy in a gentler China may prove an attractive option to 
China’s disputed peripheral communities, it would also go a long way toward 
easing concerns about China’s rise in the world at large. 
 
 
 
 
